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Comments
Direct Actions-Insurance Contracts*
By passage of the Direct Action Statute' the Louisiana Legislature not only took unprecedented action as to the scope of
regulating insurance but also conferred upon an injured party a
unique2 method of obtaining relief against insurers. Since its
* Without committing them to any of the opinions herein expressed, the
with gratitude the help furnished by Mr. Minos H.

writer acknowledges

Armentor of the New Iberia Bar; Mr. John M. Madison of the Shreveport
Bar; and Mr. John A. Patin of the Lake Charles Bar.
1. La. Act 253 of 1918, as amended by La. Acts 55 of 1930 and 541 of 1950;
La. R.S. 1950, 22:655. The present statute reads: "No policy or contract of
liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains
provisions to the effect that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured, shall
not release the insurer from the payment of damages for injuries sustained
or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy, and any judgment
which may be rendered against the insured for which the insurer is liable
which shall have become executory, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of
the insolvency of the insured, and an action may thereafter be maintained
within the terms and limits of the policy by the injured person or his or her
heirs against the insurer. The injured person or his or her heirs, at their
option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms
and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury occurred
or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said action may be
brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the
insurer, jointly and in solido. This right of direct action shall exist whether
the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of
Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the
State of Louisiana. Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to
affect the provisions of the policy or contract if the same are not in violation
of the laws of this state. It is the intent of this Section that any action
brought hereunder shall be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy
or contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct
action brought by the insured, provided the terms and conditions of such
policy or contract are not in violation of the laws of this state." (Italics
supplied.)
2. Wisconsin has a somewhat similar statute; however, its application is
limited to actions arising from automobile accidents. See Wis. Stat. 1951,
§§ 85.93, 260.11. Application of the Wisconsin statute will be found in the
following cases: Lang v. Baumann, 213 Wis. 258, 251 N.W. 461 (1933); Ortel v.
Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1933); Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28,
265 N.W. 76 (1936); Kujawa v. American Indemnity Co., 245 Wis. 361, 14 N.W.
2d 31 (1944); Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, 356 Wis, 507, 41 N.W. 2d 611 (1950).
In Ortel v. Williams, supra, the Wisconsin statute was held to be procedural in that the "direct action" against the insurer can be enforced in
Wisconsin even if based on a tort committed in another state. (The insurance
policy involved was a Wisconsin contract.)
In the case of Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932),
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that to give the statute retroactive
effect would make it unconstitutional as impairing the obligations of contracts; therefore, the rights granted by the statute could not be asserted
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enactment, the statute 3 has had a very stormy life. A proper
understanding of this turbulent reception requires a review and
appreciation of the history of the direct action statute; hence this
comment will deal with (1) the historical background of the present act,4 and (2) a brief discussion of the cases interpreting the
present statute and its predecessors, pointing up certain apparently conflicting views.
HISTORY

There is nothing novel in the idea that states may regulate
corporations. The scope of regulation is practically unlimited.
The opinion in Paul v. Virginia,5 a decision in the field of insurance, epitomizes this rule. The natural result of that decision
was more extensive regulation of insurance by the states. Such
regulation has not been confined to the prerequisites required of
the insurance company to do business within a state, but has
included legislation concerning the respective rights of the
assured, insurer and the injured party. The natural reaction of
the insurance corporation was a search for legitimate means to
protect its interest.
Prior to enactment of the direct action statute, the right of an
injured third person to recover on a liability policy was dependent upon the construction of the policy itself. In contracts for
indemnity "against liability," a judgment against the insured
created that liability, giving rise to a right in the judgment creditor to the proceeds of the insurance; 6 but many insurance comwhere the policy was issued and the accident sued on occurred prior to the
effective date of the statute. Further, in the case of Byerly v. Thorpe, supra,

the court refused to allow joinder of the insurer with the insured in a case
where, though the tort was committed in Wisconsin, the policy involved was
written in Illinois and contained a "no action" clause valid in that state. The
court held that it would be an impairment of a contractual obligation and
hence unconstitutional.

3. See note 1 supra.
4. See note 1 supra.
5. 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1868).

This case held that insurance was not com-

merce; and hence, subject to virtually unlimited state regulation. United
States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) in effect overruled Paul v. Virginia, and held that insurance was in commerce and when

conducted across state lines was interstate commerce, subject to regulation
by the Congress under the United States Constitution. That the SouthEastern Underwriters case paved the way for eventual federal regulation of

insurance cannot be questioned; however, the immediate effect of this decision was the enactment of the McCarren Act (59 Stat. 33 [1945], 15 U.S.C.
§ 1011 et seq. [1945]), which was designed to continue and to reinforce state
regulation of insurance.
6. Vance, Insurance, 999-1000, § 196 (3 ed. 1951); Richards, Insurance,
901-902, § 503 (4 ed. 1932).
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panies inserted clauses in the policy obligating themselves to
indemnify the insured "for loss actually sustained and paid by
the insured," or, as in other policies, "for loss actually sustained
and paid by the assured in satisfaction of a judgment after trial
of the issue." These clauses, commonly referred to as "no action"
clauses, were rigidly upheld." The insured could not recover until
he had proved a payment or satisfaction of his liability." Where
the insured became insolvent or bankrupt during or after the
trial, the injured party secured merely a worthless judgment.
The insured, not being able to pay the judgment, lost nothing;
consequently, the condition precedent to the insurer's liability
never occurred. 9
By the devices above described insurance companies were
often able to escape liability. Legislation to correct this apparent
inequity was deemed necessary by the Louisiana Legislature. The
first such remedial act was passed by the Legislature in 1918.10
This act provided, in effect, that insolvency or bankruptcy of the
insured would not release the insurer from liability, but would
give to the injured party a right of action against the insurance
company "within the terms and limits of the policy." The insurance carrier was allowed to require, however, that judgment first
be obtained against the assured, and his insolvency, or bankruptcy, made to appear by-proper proof."1 The scope of the 1918
act 12 was broadened by an amendment in 193013 to give to an
injured party a direct right of action against the insurer "within
the terms and limits of the policy." Thus it was no longer
necessary for the injured party first to obtain judgment against
the insured.' 4 The phrase "within the terms and limits of the
policy," has been interpreted to refer to such terms as the time
7. 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 485 (1941).
8. Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 881, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 958 (3rd Cir.
1906). See authorities collected in Note, 37 A.L.R. 637.
9. Thacher v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co., 287 Fed. 484 (8th Cir. 1923).
10. La. Act 253 of 1918. Such remedial legislation was by no means limited
to Louisiana. Cf. Comment, 9 Oregon L. Rev. 57 (1930); Notes, 15 Iowa L. Rev.
73 (1930), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1325 (1933).
11. Edwards v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929).
Here the court held proper proof of bankruptcy, or insolvency, to be an
unsatisfied judgment against the insured.
12. See note 10, supra.
13. La. Act 55 of 1930.
14. Though the act was given retroactive effect is constitutionality was
upheld; it was held not to impair the obligations of contract. Gager v.
Teche Transfer Co., 143 So. 62 (La. App. 1932); Rossville Commercial Alcohol
Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (1931).
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within which notice had to be given, the character of the risk
15
involved, and the time within which suit might be brought.
Prior to 1948 the Louisiana Legislature had passed laws regulating insurance and had amended these acts from time to time,
but there had been no effort to collect this body of the law and
codify the same. This situation was remedied by the adoption of
the Insurance Code of 1948.16 Within this compilation we find
the direct action statute as Section 14.45.1'
A general compilation of all laws was effected in 1950 by the
18
adoption of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of that year. The
newly adopted insurance code was embodied in the Revised
Statutes of 1950 as Title 22, and the direct action statute became
Section 655 of that title.' 9 At the regular session of the Legislature that year, Act 541, which amended Section 655,20 was passed.
There seems to be a fairly obvious reason why this act was
passed, and in the discussion of the cases which follow, the writer
will endeavor to disclose such reason. Suffice it for the present
to say that passage of Act 541, and its companion, Act 542,21 has
created lively interest on the part of both bench and bar and
considerable diversity of opinion.
15. Rambin v. Southern Sales Co., 145 So. 46 (La. App. 1932). In Bougon v.

Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797, 801 (La. App. 1934), an insurance company
contended that the act only gave the injured party a direct right of action
when there was no clause inserted in the insurance contract forbidding such
action. The court in holding such contention a "manifest absurdity," said:
"The foundation of the action .of the insured is in contract, to which the

injured party is a stranger, except insofar as the statutory provisions may
be incorporated in the policy." See also Graham v. American Employers' Ins.
Co., 171 So. 471 (La. App. 1937), wherein it was held that the statutory provisions were controlling over contrary policy provisions.
16. La. Act 195 of 1948.
17. Louisiana Insurance Code of 1948, § 14.45.
18. La. Act 2 of 1950 (2 E.S.).
19. La. R.S. 1950, 22:655.
20. La. Act 541 of 1950, amending La. R.S. 1950, 22:655.
21. La. Act 542 of 1950, adding La. R.S. Supp. 1950, 22:983E, which reads
as follows: "No certificate of authority to do business in Louisiana shall be
issued to a foreign or alien liability insurer until such insurer shall consent
to being sued by the injured person or his or her heirs in a direct action as
provided in Section 655 of this Title, whether the policy of insurance sued

upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not, and whether
or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided
that the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana. The said

foreign or alien insurer shall deliver to the Secretary of State as a condition
precedent to the issuance of such authority, an instrument evidencing such
consent."
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INTERPRETATION AS DISCLOSED BY THE
REPORTED CASES

Since the 1918 act 22 does not purport to confer upon the
injured party a direct cause of action strictly speaking, the cases
interpreting this act will not be discussed here. 23
The present discussion of the cases dealing with the 1930
act 24 will by no means be exhaustive, but selective only. The 1930
act has been held to be retroactive in its application and the right
of direct action thus provided has been made available against
an insurer on a policy written prior to the effective date of the
act. 25 That retroactive legislation, in the remedial as distinguished
from the substantive field, is constitutional is hardly open to
question. It has been held that the remedy provided by the 1930
act is enforceable in Louisiana in a suit on an accident which
occurred therein, even though the contract of insurance was
written in another state and the policy contained a "no action"
clause which was valid in the state where the contract was
executed. 26 Further, the right of direct action under this act
cannot be maintained in another jurisdiction even though based
on an accident which occurred in Louisiana.2 The courts in these
22. La. Act 253 of 1918.
23. An application of this act will be found in the following cases: Lawrason v. Owners' Automobile Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 172 La. 1075, 136 So. 57
(1931); Edwards v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 11 La. App. 176,
123 So. 162 (1929).
24. La. Act 55 of 1930.
25. See note 14, supra.
26. Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936).
27. Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 132 F. 2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942);
McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939). In both
the Wells case and McArthur case the conflict of laws situation was the
same; that is, the tort was committed in Louisiana and the suit was brought
in another state. In neither case was the direct action statute applied; for
this conflict situation, the statute was held to be procedural. Another conflict situation was presented in the case of Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946). Therein a wife's suit against her
husband's liability insurer was disallowed. The tort occurred in Mississippi
and the suit was brought in Louisiana. Both husband and wife were Louisiana residents. Under the law of Mississippi a wife does not have a right or
cause of action against her husband for a tort committed against her. The
court pointed out that "The Statute does not give plaintiff any more rights
than she has under the law of Mississippi. It only furnishes her with a
method to enforce in Louisiana whatever rights she has in Mississippi. The
mere fact that under the statute plaintiff was able to obtain jurisdiction
against her husband's liability insurer in a direct action in this state does not
create, as against her husband, or as against his insurer, a substantive cause
of action that does not exist under the law of the State where the wrongful
act occurred." (Italics supplied.) 209 La. 495, 503, 24 So. 2d 875, 877. The
holding in the Burke case is consonant with the holdings in the Wells and
McArthur cases that the direct action statute for conflict purposes is
procedural.
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cases accepted the interpretation of the act as handed down by the
28
Louisiana courts.
The Louisiana courts have held that in a suit against the
insurer alone-the tortfeasor not being joined as a party defendant-the insurer cannot set up defenses which are purely personal to the insured.2 9 In the case of Harvey v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Company3 0 the court of appeal held that a plea of coverture, available to the husband to defeat recovery by his wife for
injuries resulting from his negligent operation of an automobile,
was a personal defense which was not available to the husband's
liability insurer. The Louisiana Supreme Court in a later case
held that a wife could not sue her husband's liability insurer for
injuries sustained by her in an accident which occurred in Mississippi as a result of her husband's alleged negligence.8 1 There
the court said: "Where the action is brought in one jurisdiction
for a tort committed in another the rights and liabilities of the
parties are determined by the laws of the place where the wrong
is committed and not by the laws of the place where the right of
3 2
action is asserted.)
Since the larger percentage of insurance corporations are
foreign corporations, federal jurisdiction is frequently invoked
on grounds of diversity of citizenship.3 3 A reading of the federal
cases discloses that the jurisdiction question was first pin-pointed
3 4
in the case of New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Soileau.
In the field of federal jurisdiction the direct action statute
28. Graham v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So. 471 (La. App. 1937);
Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936); Gager v. Teche Transfer Co.,
143 So. 62 (La. App. 1932); Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis
Sheen Transfer Co., 1.8La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (1931).
29. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App.
1936) (public liability insurer of municipality cannot raise defense of sovereign immunity); Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935) (minor child
can bring suit and recover against his father's insurer); Edwards v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) (wife may sue insurer of the
car owned in community and recover for her personal injuries).
30. 6 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1942). See the authorities therein collected.
31. Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875
(1946). See discussion under note 27, supra.
32. Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 499, 500, 24 So.
2d 875, 876. See also A.L.I., Conflict of Laws, § 384 (1934).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1946).
34. 167 F. 2d 767 (5th Cir. 1948). Here jurisdiction was specially unheld.
In the following earlier cases it appears jurisdiction was assumed without
argument: Banks v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 161 F. 2d 305 (5th Cir. 1947);
Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Rivet, 89 F. 2d 74 (5th Cir. 1937); Bunkers
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Leake, 84 F. 2d 191 (5th Cir. 1936).
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has received varied treatment. Judge Dawkins in a 1945 decision 5
held that the 1930 act "does not increase the liability of the
insured at all or deprive the insurer of any defense to which it
would otherwise be entitled. It simply says that, instead of
pursuing the circuitous route of first suing a tortfeasor, and then,
if necessary, bringing an action against the insurer, the whole
matter may be determined once and for all by suing the insurer
direct, who may have all the benefits of any defense, which could
be claimed by its principal, the insured."3 6 The judge further
stated that the Louisiana statute (Act 55 of 1930) does not affect
the obligation of the insurance contract even though the policy
was issued outside the State of Louisiana and contained a "no
action" clause which was valid in the state in which the contract
was issued. He said the act merely affected the order in which
persons could sue upon the insurance contract. And further,
Judge Dawkins was of the opinion that the insurance contract
was "tripartite in its nature, since the very purpose was to provide for the payment or indemnification of the insured for any
and all claims of every person lawfully ascertained against him."8 7
Until the adoption of the Insurance Code 38 the direct cause of
action as applied to policies issued outside the state appears to
have been fairly well settled. However, in the case of Belanger v.
Great American Indemnity Company of New York,3 9 Judge
Wright, in denying the direct action on an insurance contract
issued outside the state, said: "The Louisiana Legislature with
full knowledge of this line of jurisprudence giving extraterritorial effect to Act 55 repealed the act and enacted Section 14.45
of the Louisiana Insurance Code. The intention of the Legislature to limit Section 14.45, under which the right of direct action
against liability insurers is now provided, to policies of insurance
issued in Louisiana is manifested by the first clause of the act
which reads as follows: 'No policy or contract of liability insurance' shall be issued or delivered in this State. . . .' By this language it is apparent that the Legislature rather than risk the
possibility of Section 14.45 being declared unconstitutional as
35. Rogers v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. La.

1945).
36. Id. at 143.
37. Ibid. It might be noted that Judge Dawkins was aware of the contrary decision of Judge Caillouet in the case of Wheat v. White, 38 F. Supp.
796 (E.D. La. 1941).
38. La. Act 195 of 1948.
39. 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La. 1950).
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applied to out of state liability policies specifically limited its
application to policies issued in Louisiana. ' 40 The position taken
by Judge Wright was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in a per curiam opinion 41 handed down after passage of
Act 541 of 1950.42 On appeal, counsel for plaintiff called the
court's attention to the aforesaid act and a concurrent resolution
adopted by the Louisiana Legislature on June 26, 1950, to the
effect that it was never the intention of the 1948 Legislature, in
enacting Section 14.45, to repeal or in any wise restrict Act 55 of
1930 so far as it provided direct action against liability insurers.
Reversal of the district court's order had been sought on the
theory that the direct action is remedial and procedural and hence
that Act 541 of 1950 should be given retroactive effect even
though the order might have been proper when entered. The
court summarily dismissed this contention: "The defendant was
entitled to have its rights determined in accordance with existing
law, and this being done, the adjudication may not be annulled
by subsequent legislation. ' 43 It might be noted that the constitutional question discussed by the district court was not
mentioned.
It would appear that the Legislature had in mind the rule
enunciated by the lower court in the Belanger case when it
passed Acts 541 and 542 of 1950. Act 541 was apparently designed
to overrule that case by legislative act. Act 542 was apparently
designed to overcome any constitutional objections to Act 541.
This would seem to follow when it is recalled that the district
court in the Belanger case stated in dictum that the application
of a direct action statute to a case involving a policy issued and
delivered outside of the state was unconstitutional if such policy
contained a "no action" clause.
Judge Dawkins had occasion to deal with points similar to
40. Id. at 738. The court further added: "There is a further and even
more fundamental reason why the plaintiff cannot maintain his direct action
against the insurer in this case. The policy of insurance herein relied on has
a 'no action' clause and is governed by the law of Massachusetts where 'no
action' clauses in policies of insurance are permitted under the laws of the
state." To allow him to invalidate a substantial part of that contract by
applying Section 14.45 of the Louisiana Insurance Code is to deprive the

defendant of due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the
United States.
41. Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 188 F. 2d 196 (5th
Cir. 1951).

42. See note 1 supra.
43. Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 188 F. 2d 196, 198
(5th Cir. 1951).
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In the case of Bouis v. Aetna
those involved in the Belanger case.
Casualty and Surety Company44 plaintiff, a Louisiana resident,
brought a direct action against the non-resident insurer of the
manufacturer of a shotgun which had exploded in plaintiff's face.
The insurance contract sued on had been issued and delivered
outside the state and contained a "no action" clause which was
valid in the state of delivery. Section 14.45 of the Insurance Code
was in effect when the policy was issued, when the accident happened and when suit was filed. The defendant insurer urged:
(1) that the law of Louisiana at the time the policy was written
limited the right to sue the insurer alone, without first reducing
the claim to judgment against the insured, to cases where the
policies were written or delivered in Louisiana; (2) that if interpreted so as to permit a direct action in this case, the act would
impair the obligations of its insurance contract in violation of
Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution and
Section 1 of Article IV requiring "full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial
Proceedings of every other State," and would violate the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court rejected these contentions and concluded that
Section 14.45 of the Insurance Code applied when plaintiff's suit
was filed and that at that time the action against the insurer was
premature because of the "no action" clause and the rule expressed in the Belanger case. However, plaintiff's action was not
defeated. The court reviewed the direct action statutes and concluded: "It seems to be settled that these statutes do deal with
Therefore, this court feels impelled to overprocedure alone ....
rule the claims of unconstitutionality, under the Federal Constitution. '45 Since Acts 54146 and 54247 had become effective before
the decision was handed down, the court applied them retroactively to sustain plaintiff's claim even though his suit was premature when brought. When the instant case arose there had
been no state decision construing these acts; the court therefore
applied general principles of statutory construction and decided
both acts were procedural. The court reviewed the holding in
Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Company v. Wilson 48 and said:
"In view of this ruling [that procedural legislation may be given
44. 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950).

45. Id. at 957.
46. See note 1 supra.
47. See note 21 supra.

48. 195 La. 814, 197 So. 566 (1940).
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retroactive effect] by the state court, since it is settled that the
right to sue the insurer directly and without previous reduction
of the claim to judgment against the insured, does not involve a
substantive right but merely procedure, the remedy in that respect found in Acts Nos. 541 and 542 of 1950 is available and
applies to the proceeding before us, they simply having rendered
invalid the provisions of the policy prescribing the procedure
which required that judgment should first be obtained against
'49
the insured.
In the case of Bayard v. Traders & General Insurance Company50 Judge Dawkins handed down a decision exactly contra to
that rendered by him in the Bouis case. In the Bayard case, the
contract had likewise been issued and delivered outside the state
by a nonresident insurer and contained the "no action" clause.
The plaintiff was a Louisiana resident. Judge Dawkins viewed
at length previous Louisiana cases decided in both state and
federal courts and observed: "It thus appears that there has
been much confusion and disagreement both among the state
courts of Louisiana and in the decisions of the federal courts of
this state, some holding that Act No. 55 of 1930 had created a
substantive right which necessarily changed and enlarged the
obligations of the insurer where the policy contract had been
made in other states whose laws permitted the 'no action' stipulation; while in others, it was said that the provision for direct
action against the insurer alone was merely procedural or remedial."' The court then decided that it must determine for itself
what constitutes substantive, as distinguished from procedural
law. Along this line the court commented: "The tort action of
the Code is the basis for all liability of this kind, and it makes
responsible only the person who committed the wrong. Act No.
55 of 1930 has in effect attempted to add to Article 2315 another
person in no wise at fault simply because he has agreed for a
premium to indemnify the tort-feasor within limits against his
52
Judge Dawkins
own wrongs, after they have been proven."
then added, "I am finally convinced that Act No. 55 of 1930 made
a fundamental and substantial change in the right of action under
those indemnity policies, or, as they are now called, liability con49. Bouis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 91 F. Supp. 954, 959-960 (W.D.

La. 1950).
50. 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).

51. Id. at 353.
52. Id. at 354.
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tracts, not confined to procedure or remedy."5 3 (Italics supplied.)
The direct action remedy was then found to be a permissible
expression of the Legislature as applied to insurance contracts
made in Louisiana. But with reference to contracts lawfully made
and to be executed in other states, the court held that the Federal
Constitution5 4 prevents the exercise of arbitrary power not
founded upon some legitimate principle of state public policy.
(Italics supplied.) And the court in sustaining the defendant
insurer's motion to dismiss evidently did not find this legitimate
principle of state public policy.
In evaluating the Bayard case, it is well to keep in mind the
rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 55 that in a diversity case a
federal court adjudicating a state-created right is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the state.56 Though the
federal court is bound by the interpretation placed on the state
statute, it may nevertheless strike the statute down on constitutional ground." In the Bayard case the constitutional objection
was held to be applicable only to contracts lawfully made and
to be applied in other states. It might be noted that at this juncture the decisions of the Eastern and Western Districts of the
federal courts were in accord.58
Judge Porterie of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana in the case of Buxton v. Midwestern
Insurance Company59 disagreed with the position taken by Judge
Dawkins of the same district. In the Buxton case, plaintiff, a
Louisiana resident, brought a direct action against Midwestern
and Pacific for personal injuries sustained when an automobile
driven by Midwestern's insured, and in which plaintiff was riding
as a guest, was involved in a collision with an automobile owned
by Pacific's insured. Defendant Pacific'moved to dismiss. In
denying the motion the court held that since Pacific had consented
to being sued directly in accordance with R.S. 22:983E, a direct
action by plaintiff was permissible. Plaintiff's action was founded
on two different insurance contracts, one issued and delivered in
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 354-355.
U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1, Art. I, § 10, and 14th Amend. § 1.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Moore, Commentary on the United States Judicial Code 317, 1 0.03(45)

(1949).
57. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in
North America, 73 S. Ct. 143 (U.S. 1952).
58. Bayard v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951);
Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La.

1950).
59. 102 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La. 1952).
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Louisiana, the other issued and delivered in Texas. The latter
contained a "no action" clause which was valid in that state.
Even though it was not sued on a contract which was issued in
Louisiana, Pacific was nevertheless doing business here and had
complied with the "consent to be sued" provision of Act 542 of
1950. Although the court said that the question before it was the
constitutionality of Acts 541 and 542 of 1950,60 a careful reading
of the case does not indicate that this issue was squarely ruled
upon."1 The following language is found in the opinion, however:
"The Act, La. Act 542 of 1950, makes no hostile discrimination
against or among foreign or alien insurers; it merely tends to put
them on the same footing as domestic insurers. Resident and
non-resident insurers are treated alike. '62 The court's determination that Pacific was bound by its consent to be sued directly on
policies issued out of Louisiana as a result of accidents happening
in Louisiana, rendered it unnecessary to determine whether Act
541 of 1950 was procedural or substantive law. The court intimated that the Soileau case63 was decided at a time when there
was no law comparable to Act 542 of 1950. As to the Texas law
permitting and enforcing a "no action" clause in its insurance
policies, the court posed the constitutional question conversely,
that is, would not the Texas law have extraterritorial effect if
held to be enforceable in Louisiana in the face of contrary Louisiana policy and laws? This question was pretermitted.
Judge Dawkins a few days later handed down his opinion
in Bish v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation,4 which
held exactly contra to the decision in the Buxton case. Plaintiff,
a Louisiana citizen, sued the insurer of the Toni Corporation for
injuries she sustained as a result of using a Toni home permanent. The defendant in the Bish case, a foreign corporation, had
likewise complied with Act 542 of 1950. The contract sued upon
contained a "no action" clause which was valid in the state in
which the contract was issued. The court, adhering to its posi60. Id. at 505.
61. Id. at 507, 508. "The insurer, Pacific, can rightfully be sued here also.
It is found here.... Consequently, we do not reach-and need not overreach
to inquire into-the constitutional objections raised by Pacific." And further:
"In other words, there is no impairment of the obligations of its insurance
contract with Houston, because, at the time of the confection of that contract
affected by the public interest, Pacific was doing business in Louisiana and
by its own voluntary consent it never became an obligation to the [sic]
impaired."
62. Id. at 509.

63. See note 34 supra.
64. 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1952).
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tion in the Bayard case,6 5 said: "After careful consideration of the
arguments and authorities cited by plaintiff, the writer is still of
the view that if these statutes are to be held valid at all, their
operation must be confined to Louisiana contracts. Any other
conclusion would give them an extraterritorial effect not permissible."6 6 (Italics supplied.) The court further observed that the
Louisiana statutes authorizing direct action against the insurer
constituted arbitrary deprivation of property without due process,
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constituif the policy sued upon was
tion. This observation applied even
67
written and delivered in Louisiana.
In point of time, it appears that the Bish case was followed
by Fisher v. Home Indemnity Company.6 8 In the latter, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the direct action would not
lie in view of a "no action" provision in the policy sued on. This
holding sustained the ruling of the district court. In the instant
case, plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, allegedly sustained injuries
from consuming a medicinal preparation known as "Westsal."
Suit was brought against the foreign insurer of the nonresident
pharmaceutical manufacturer. The contract sued on was executed and delivered outside the state and the defendant had
qualified to do business in Louisiana. The defendant had not filed
the consent to be sued until after the case had been tried below,
and such consent was not called to the attention of the district
court until after the cause had been decided by it, and the record
had been lodged with the appellate court.
The decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. Eunice Rice Milling
Company"9 followed in the wake of the Fisher holding. Plaintiff,
a Louisiana resident, had sued on a contract executed and delivered in Texas by the defendant, a Wisconsin insurance corporation. In a brief opinion, Chief Justice Hutcheson, as organ of the
court, struck down the plaintiff's attempt to sue the insurer
directly. Judge Russell, who had been with the majority in the
Fisher case, dissented. The opinion of the majority was based upon
65. See note 50 supra.
66. 102 F. Supp. 343, 345 (W.D. La. 1952).
67. Apparently the court overlooked its position in the Bayard case. See
text immediately following note 53, wherein the same court held the direct
action to be a permissible expression of the Legislature as applied to insurance contracts made in Louisiana. See p. 505 supra.
68. 198 F. 2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952).
69. 198 F. 2d 613 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 73 S. Ct. 171 (U.S. 1952).
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the ruling in the Fisher case, and, as Judge Russell aptly points
out, it overlooks the stipulation in the contract in the second
case limiting coverage to "operations performed in the State of
Louisiana." Furthermore, the insurer was authorized to do and
was doing business in Louisiana.
70
In the case of Cushing v. Maryland Casualty Company
Judge Strum, as organ for the Fifth Circuit, reversed a dismissal
of plaintiff's direct action by Judge Wright of the district court.
The position taken by Judge Strum is not necessarily inconsistent
with his position in the Fisher and Eunice Rice Milling Company
cases. It will be recalled that in those cases the contract sued on
had been issued outside the state whereas in the present case
the policies involved were issued and delivered in Louisiana. For
the proposition that the Louisiana direct action statute is remedial, the court cited Gager v. Teche Transfer Company7 ' and
72
Hudson v. Georgia Casualty Company.
A subsequent expression of Judge Dawkins' position will be
found in the case of Mayo v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company.7 3 Plaintiff, a Texas resident, was
injured in Louisiana as a result of an automobile accident involving another Texas resident. Suit against the tortfeasor's insurer
was brought directly. The defendant, a Swiss corporation, was
qualified to do business in Louisiana and had complied with the
provisions of Acts 541 and 542 of 1950. The contract sued on was
issued and delivered in Texas and contained a valid "no action"
clause. The court was of the opinion that the effect of the direct
action statute was a deprivation of the defendant's property-the
benefits of contract provisions valid in the state where madewithout due process of law and hence contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The court relied on its
decisions in the Bayard and Bish cases.
The case of Elbert v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company7 4 presented an instance in which both the injured party and
alleged tortfeasor were Louisiana residents. Plaintiff, a guest in
the automobile of defendant's assured, was injured as she alighted
therefrom. Suit was brought against the insurer directly on a
70. 198 F. 2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952).
71. See note 14 supra.
72. 57 F. 2d 757 (W.D. La. 1932).
73. 106 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. La. 1952).
74. 107 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1952), rehearing denied 108 F. Supp. 157

(W.D. La. 1952).
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policy issued in Louisiana. A motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that there was no diversity of citizenship between
the real parties to the controversy was sustained. The court cited
Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank 5 to sustain its position.
Without considering the merits of this contention7 6 and in view
of the decisions in the Soileau77 and Cushing78 cases, it is submitted the holding in the Elbert case is clearly erroneous.
In the case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Cor19
poration,
Judge Dawkins reiterated his position. Therein Act
541 of 1950 was again held unconstitutional as to contracts made
outside Louisiana. Plaintiffs, Louisiana residents, filed suit originally in the state court for Bienville Parish against the defendant, a nonresident insurer, alone. The suit was brought on a
policy issued outside the state. The insurer removed to federal
court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiffs then
amended their complaint in an attempt to join the assured, also
a nonresident, as a party defendant. Motion to dismiss on the
grounds of unconstitutionality of the direct action statute was
sustained. It is to be noted that the court in the Watson case
said: "The decisions holding Act 55 of 1930 and Act 541 . . . of
1950 ... unconstitutional as to contracts made outside the State
and valid where made, have had the effect of saying there is no
right or cause of action originally against the insurer alone when
it was filed in the State Court.' 80 (Italics supplied.) The court
pointed out that the issues involved in the motion to dismiss the
insurer on the ground of the unconstitutionality of Act 541 of
1950 were the same as in the Bish case. 8'
Later, in the case of Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, 2 Judge Porterie again sustained the validity of
the direct action statute. In the Lewis case both plaintiffs and the
alleged tortfeasors were Louisiana citizens. Federal jurisdiction
was invoked solely on the ground of diverse citizenship, the plaintiffs suing the tortfeasors' liability insurer alone. The defendant
75. 314 U.S. 63 (1941).

76. On this point see Moore, Federal Practice, fT 17.01-17.02, 17.07 (2 ed.
1948); Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 Yale L.J. 1291,
1310-1312 (1935). Cf. Notes, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 769 (1946), 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1066
(1952), 29 Marq. L. Rev. 129 (1946).
77. See note 34 supra.
78. See note 70 supra.
79. 107 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. La. 1952).
80. Id. at 495.
81. See note 64 supra.
82. 107 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. La. 1952).
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was authorized to do business in this state and had filed consent
to be sued as required by R.S. 22: 983E. Though not specifically
stated in the opinion, the contract sued on was apparently issued
in Louisiana. Defendant insurer moved to dismiss on the grounds
that (a) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted; (b) the provisions of Act 541 of 1950 were procedural and therefore not applicable; (c) the sole controversy
was between plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasors, all Louisiana
citizens; and (d) there was no "case" or "controversy" between
plaintiffs and defendant. The court tersely dismissed (a) above
with the remark that a claim upon which relief could be granted
was plainly stated, citing Rule 8 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 3 As to (b) above the court said: "R.S. 22:655 has been
declared so many times to be substantive by final authority that
we deny this phase of defendant's motion without elaboration by
merely citing the latest case on the point. ' 8 4 (Here the court cited
the Cushing case.) In the same terse vein the court said whether
or not there was a controversy between plaintiffs and the tortfeasors was immaterial to the issue involved, for the sole issue
related to whether or not a "controversy" existed between plaintiffs and defendant. Answering the issue presented, the court
said (inter alia): "We have already adjudicated that a controversy exists between a wrongfully injured member of the public
and the public liability insurer of the tort-feasor,irrespective of
the citizenship of the insured tort-feasor and the wrongfully
injured member of the public, and that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine that controversy if there is diversity
of citizenship between the injured and the insurer and over
We have
$3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, is involved ....
been affirmed on the point by a Court which we are bound to
follow. 5 (Italics supplied.) (Here the court cited the Soileau
case.) Though the constitutionality of the direct action statute
was not specifically raised in the instant case, it is to be noted
that the court adverted to the fact that the court had had the
occasion to adjudicate on numerous constitutional objections
levelled at these statutes. The Buxton, Fisher and Cushing cases
were cited as sustaining the validity of said statute. The position
of Judge Porterie in the Lewis case is not necessarily inconsistent
with the position taken by Judge Dawkins in the Watson case,
83. Id. at 469.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
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for there the contract sued on was executed outside the state.
However, it is utterly impossible to reconcile the position taken
by Judge Dawkins in the Elbert case with that taken by Judge
Porterie in the Lewis case.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A precise statement of the law relating to the Louisiana
Direct Action Statute is impossible at the present due to the
varied treatment given it by the judiciary. An analysis of the
jurisprudence relating to the treatment of the direct action statute shows a distinction between insurance contracts of a Louisiana origin and those originating in another state. It would
appear that the weight of authority would allow the use of direct
action against the insurer when the contract or policy is made
and issued in Louisiana. Some decisions like the Bish case indicate otherwise. However, it is submitted that direct action against
the insurer should be available on all policies entered into in the
State of Louisiana.
The real penumbra zone lies in the area of insurance policies
entered into in other states when such contracts contain valid "no
action" clauses. Here we find the conflict of extraterritorial effect
of Louisiana Direct Action Statute versus extraterritorial effect
of a "no action" clause valid in the state of origin. Authority for
the constitutionality of the direct action statute in such a situation is found in the Buxton case. It would appear that the views
of Judges Porterie and Christenberry would probably support
the constitutionality of direct action in such instances. On the
other hand Judges Wright and Dawkins undoubtedly find constitutional frailties in any application of direct action statutes to
foreign insurance policies.
Examination of the history of the direct action statute clearly
indicates a public policy behind this type of legislation. This
policy is most cogently disclosed by Judge Porterie in the Lewis
case: "The public policy of this State, announced time and again,
is that an insurance policy against liability to the public is not
issued primarily for the protection of the insured, but for the
protection of the general public."' 6 (Italics supplied.) Ordinarily
the public policy of a state is what the Legislature says that it
shall be-unless the Legislature has acted beyond its sphere. It is
submitted the purposes sought to be attained by the direct action
86. Id. at 471.
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statute are legitimate and proper, and the means employed to
that end are not arbitrary and capricious but constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. This observation, in the
writer's opinion, is valid only insofar as applied to Louisiana
contracts. Public policy of the state would seem to warrant
upholding the direct action statute to that extent. However, as
to contracts issued outside the state (and containing a valid "no
action" clause), it would seem that the public policy of the state
would come into conflict with certain constitutional prohibitions.
It hardly seems equitable that merely because the insurer happened to be doing business in Louisiana, it should be sued
directly on a contract which is in no manner connected with its
business conducted in this state.
There is a line of cases which may lend weight to the above
opinion. In Terral v. Burke ConstructionCompany8 7 an Arkansas
statute which prohibited removal from state courts, was found
unconstitutional. The statute provided for the revocation of the
authority granted to any foreign company to do business in the
state, if it either instituted a suit against a citizen of the state in
a federal court or removed a suit brought by or against it in a
state court to a federal court. A statute requiring, by way of a
condition precedent to doing business in the state, a foreign corporation to agree that it will not resort to the federal courts was
struck down as early as 1874.88 Of course, it must be admitted
that any argument based on these cases would have to be presented on the theory that the direct action statute is the converse
of the statute involved in the foregoing cases; that the direct
action statute is the converse of the non-removal statutes.
It is obvious that the present status of this phase of law is
highly unsatisfactory. In view of the most recent decisions, compromise between the divergent views appears highly improbable;
nor is the position taken by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
conducive to a settlement of the conflict. If our law on this subject is to emerge from this state of flux, judicial clarification is
necessary.
John S. Covington
87. 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
88. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U.S. 1874).

